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Abstract 
In this paper, we investigate the extent of the effects of children and child-related time out of the labor 
market on the gender wage gap in France, with special attention to its impact on the accumulation and 
composition of human capital. Measuring this impact requires detailed information on the individuals‟ 
activity  history  that  is  rarely  available.  The  French  survey  "Families  and  Employers"  (Ined,  2005) 
provides  this  information.  We  first  look  at  men's  and  women's  wage  determinants,  including  the 
penalties  associated  with  unemployment  and  time  out  of  the  labor  market.  We  find  that  having 
controlled for the jobs' characteristics and selection into employment, there is a penalty attached to 
child-related  time  out  of  the  labor  market,  which  affects  only  women.  We  do  not  find  any  direct 
negative impact of children on women's current hourly wage at the mean. Then for a sub-sample of 
men  and  women  aged  from  39  to  49,  we  use  a  decomposition  of  the  gender  wage  gap  into  an 
“interruption” wage gap between women and a gender wage gap between women who have never 
taken child-related time out and men; we find that the wage gap between men and women who have 
never interrupted their participation in the labor force is essentially "unexplained", while the wage gap 




Keywords:  Wages,  Human  capital,  Children,  Family  pay  gap,  Statistical  discrimination,  Wage  gap 
decomposition. 
JEL Classification: J13, J16, J24, J31 
 
Acknowledgements: The authors would like to thank the participants in the LoWER conference (Volos, 
2007),  the  TEPP  conference  (Evry,  2007),  the  PAA  conference  (New-Orleans  2008)  and  the 
“Journées  de  microéconomie  appliquée  (Saint-Denis  de  la  Réunion,  2008)  for  their  comments, 
especially Nabanita Datta-Gupta, Miriam Beblo and Catherine Sofer; thanks also to Patrick Puhani for 
his reading of an earlier version, and to the two anonymous referees for their suggestions.   2 
1. Introduction 
In many countries,  women‟s participation in the  labor market has dramatically  increased in  recent 
decades,  women‟s  education  level  has  caught  up  with  (or  even  overtaken)  that  of  men,  and  the 
gender wage gap has tended to narrow. Yet despite these major - and related - changes, the gender 
wage gap remains substantial in all countries and progress seems to have stopped since the 1990s in 
some countries (Blau and Kahn, 2007; Datta Gupta and Smith, 2006; Meurs and Ponthieux, 2006). 
One important difference that remains between genders is that women still spend more time out of the 
labor market than men, on account of motherhood. The aim of this paper is to examine the effect of 
children on women‟s and men‟s wages and the subsequent impact of child-related career interruption 
on the gender wage gap in France. 
The impact of career interruptions on women‟s wages has been investigated since a long time (Mincer 
and Polachek, 1974; Mincer and Ofek, 1982), and has been found to be negatively associated with 
earnings in various studies (Stratton, 1995; Albrecht et al, 1999; Phipps et al, 2001; Beblo and Wolf, 
2002; Datta Gupta and Smith, 2002). Employment breaks are also likely to contribute to the gender 
wage differential; for example, Hotchkiss and Pitts (2007) find that a significant part of the explained 
gender wage gap, about 60%, can be attributed to employment interruptions in the United States. 
Since  women‟s  career  interruptions  are  much  more  likely  than  men‟s  to  be  related  to  children, 
investigating  the  link  between  the  gender  wage  gap  and  differences  between  women‟s  behavior 
regarding time out is of particular interest. 
Since the mid-1990s, the “family pay gap”, i.e., the wage differential between women with and without 
children, has attracted increasing attention. If mothers face specific pay penalties, the “family gap in 
pay” could actually have a substantial influence on the level and evolution of the gender wage gap. 
Most  of  the  evidence  on  the  existence  and  extent  of  such  a  family  pay  gap  is  based  on  Anglo-
American research (Waldfogel, 1997, 1998; Joshi et al, 1999; Lundberg and Rose, 2000; Budig and 
England, 2001) and a few comparative studies (Harkness and Waldfogel, 1999; Davies and Pierre, 
2005). Significant pay penalties associated with motherhood have been found in the United States, the 
UK and Germany (Waldfogel, 1998; Davies and Pierre, 2005, Gangl and Ziefle, 2009), while in Nordic 
countries,  women  seem  to  escape  a  specific  motherhood  pay  penalty  when  human  capital 
accumulation  and  unobserved  heterogeneity  are  controlled  for  (Harkness  and  Waldfogel,  1999; 
Albrecht  et  al,  1999;  Datta  Gupta  and  Smith,  2002).  All  these  studies  point  at  employment 
interruptions as a key factor behind the family pay gap. However, there are noticeable differences in 
the  estimated  penalties  across  studies;  these  differences  are  difficult  to  interpret  because  of 
divergence in methodology, especially whether work experience, child-related time out and part-time 
work (present and past) and selection in employment are controlled for, and whether the analysis is 
based on cross section or panel data.  
In French studies, the question of a family/motherhood gap in pay has not yet been addressed. The 
only  estimates  we  were  able  to  find  for  France  are  those  in  Davies  and  Pierre‟s  comparison  of 
European countries (2005). In this study, France appears as one of the few countries where mothers 
of one or two children do not seem to face a penalty, and the penalty for three or more children   3 
depends on the estimation strategy. As for the impact of time out, previous French studies on the 
gender wage gap have provided some contrasted results: Sofer (1990) found no significant impact of 
time out either for women or for men, and even a positive significant impact for women after controlling 
for occupational feminization. Bayet (1996) obtained a comparable result for female clerical workers. 
Colin (1999) found significant negative penalties for unemployment and time out of the labor market, 
both lower for women than for men, and also that unemployment was more penalized than time out for 
women while the contrary was true for men. Similar results were obtained by Meurs and Ponthieux 
(2000) and, more recently, by Moschion and Muller (2010) for the private sector. 
The absence of studies explicitly addressing the family pay gap in France is at least partly explained 
by the relatively high participation of mothers in the labor market and low gender wage gap compared 
to other European or Anglo-American countries. However, the reform of the parental leave allowance 
in 1994 has made the issue more relevant. This reform, which has extended the allowance to include 
the  second  child  (it  was  only  available  from  the  third  child  before),  has  resulted  in  an  increased 
incidence of work interruptions (Piketty, 2005) and in longer employment breaks after birth (Pailhé and 
Solaz, 2006). As for its impact on subsequent wages, Lequien (2009) finds a negative causal effect of 
parental leave on women‟s daily wages of about 10% per year of interruption.  
Another reason for the small number of studies on the impact of child-related time out in France could 
be that it requires data, especially with regard to individuals‟ work experience and the duration and 
nature of employment breaks, that only a small number of French datasets can provide. Experience is 
then often approximated by potential experience measured as the number of years since leaving initial 
education, which means that any period, whether at work or not, is taken at the same value. Yet 
studies using detailed work histories (Light and Ureta, 1995; Green and Ferber, 2008) or actual work 
experience have shown that relying on potential experience may result in misestimating the returns to 
human capital or to other characteristics (Filer, 1993), while a lack of information on the duration and 
nature of employment breaks may result in misestimating penalties on time out (Albrecht et al, 1999) 
or skill depreciation (Edin and Gustavsson, 2008). 
Datasets  providing  detailed  information  on  wages,  individuals‟  family  characteristics,  employment 
characteristics and activity history all at the same time are quite scarce. Especially, many data sources 
do  not  allow  to  compute  actual  work  experience  or  to  distinguish  between  various  reasons  for 
employment breaks. In France, the “Enquête Familles et Employeurs” collected by INED in 2004-05” 
(EFE after) that we are using in this paper is the most recent to provide this information. On the basis 
of individuals‟ activity history since the age of 18, it is possible to measure actual work experience and 
to  distinguish  between  several  different  types  of  employment  break.  One  drawback  is  that  it  only 
provides information on current wages. Consequently, it is not possible to deal with the possibility that 
children and wages are both linked to some unobservable differences between types of women - for 
instance,  as  suggested  by  Hakim  (1998),  home-centered  women  as  opposed  to  work-centered 
women
1.  If  that  were  the  case,  a  wage  penalty  could  be  wrongly  attributed  to  motherhood  or 
employment breaks whereas it  actually results from a lower career commitment, and the effect of 
                                                       
1 However, in Hakim‟s own estimations, a large majority of women are either “adaptative” or work-centered.   4 
career interruptions could then be overestimated. However, empirical studies suggest that unobserved 
heterogeneity is not the essential factor behind pay differentials between women: while some studies 
suggest that women with lower unobserved earning power are more likely to have children (Budig and 
England,  2001;  Datta  Gupta  and  Smith,  2006;  Waldfogel,  1997),  others  do  not  find  a  significant 
heterogeneity bias (Waldfogel, 1998; Albrecht et al, 1999; Neumark and Korenman, 1994).  
The contribution of this paper is twofold. Firstly, while - contrary to Anglo-Saxon countries - there is no 
apparent pay differential between mothers and childless women on average in France, we find that 
time spent out of the labor market to care for children results in a specific pay penalty. This result is 
based on the estimation of current hourly wages for the population of salaried women aged from 20 to 
49,  controlling  for  actual  work  experience,  the  composition  of  activity  history,  current  job 
characteristics and selection in employment. Comparing women to men, we also find that the pay 
penalty resulting from past unemployment is higher for men than for women and that children have no 
significant impact on women‟s wages, while the impact is positive for men. 
Secondly,  restricting  the  analysis  to  workers  aged  from  39  to  49,  who  are  considered  to  have 
completed  their  childbearing,  we  find  that  the  wage  differential  between  women  who  have  never 
interrupted their career and those who have spent time out on childcare is mainly due to differences in 
observed characteristics, while the wage gap between men and women who have never interrupted 
their career is mostly unexplained. These results are based on a decomposition of the gender wage 
gap into an “interruption” wage gap between women and a gender wage gap between women who 
have never taken child-related time out and men. Each part is then decomposed following Oaxaca and 
Ransom (1994).  
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 gives more details on our data and variables of interest and 
presents some descriptive statistics; section 3 presents estimates of the impact of children and child-
related  time  out  on  women‟s  and  men‟s  wages  and  section  4  presents  the  decomposition  of  the 
“interruption” wage gap and the gender wage gap. We conclude in section 5. 
 
2. Data, variables and descriptive statistics 
2.1 Data and variables 
The EFE is a national representative survey conducted from November 2004 to March 2005 on a 
sample of 9547 individuals (5107 women and 4440 men) aged between 20 and 49. In this population, 
we  retain  as  employees  individuals  who  were  working  at  least  10  hours  per  week  at  the  date  of 
interview, in order to minimize occasional participation in employment. We also exclude those whose 
monthly net wage was less than 260 euros, corresponding to the minimum monthly wage for a ten-
hour week
2. Once restricted to observations with no missing value in any of the variables used in the 
                                                       
2 The hourly minimum wage was 6.00 € net at the time. Applying this threshold results in the exclusion of only 126 
individuals: 32 men (incl. 20 childless) and 94 women (incl. 28 childless, 17 with one child, 32 with 2 children and 
17 with 3 and more), and does not bias the analysis.   5 
analysis
3, our sample contains 6232 wage earners (3101 women and 3131 men); 788 of the remaining 
individuals
4  were unemployed (346 men and 442 women), 717 were out of the  labor  market for 
reasons related to children (11 men and 706 women) and 167 individuals for other reasons (83 men 
and 84 women). 
The main independent variables are related to children and activity history
5. They are all derived from 
individual retrospective calendars of life events since the age of 18. Activity history was collected 
utilizing a grid-like format on a yearly basis. Although this retrospective information is less precise than 
repeated  observations  (i.e.,  panel  data),  the  method  used  (based  on  a  computerized  calendar 
covering family, residential and activity history) facilitates rapid and accurate recollection of life events. 
Six  activity  statuses  were  proposed:  employment  - distinguishing  between  part-time  and  full-time 
work -, unemployment, studies or training, military service, other economic inactivity.  Respondents 
were asked to indicate the  years of occurrence  for each activity lasting more than 6 months
6. An 
additional  “status”  was  proposed  to  take  into  account  shorter  spells  (i.e.,  less  than  6  months)  of 
employment or non-employment. Using this calendar, we construct the following variables: 
- potential experience, measured as the number of years since the last year of initial education;  
- actual work experience, measured as the number of years actually spent at work since leaving initial 
education
7; 
- tenure, the number of years working with the current employer; 
- employment breaks (measured in years), divided into unemployment, training
8, child-related time out 
and other reasons. Child-related time out corresponds to the time spent out of the labor force starting 
within 3 years of the birth of each child and not dedicated to training
9. These periods can last more 
than 3 years, and thus do not necessarily correspond to formal parental leave. 
                                                       
3 This results in the exclusion of 432 observations (245 men, 187 women). 
4 Students, people in retirement and self-employed are not taken into account. 
5 Only 2 other surveys provide this information. An additional module to the LFS 1997 was dedicated to careers 
(“Enquête Jeunes et carrières 1997”), but this is too close to the year of the parental leave reform for its effects to 
show in wages. The 2004 survey on households‟ assets (“Enquête Patrimoine 2004”) is recent enough, but there 
is no information regarding the number of working hours, the public/private sector or the branch of industry for 
instance; moreover, one respondent per household answers for himself and his/her partner if any, which alters the 
quality  of  the  retrospective  information  on  activity  history.  Few  panel  data  are  available  in  France;  the  main 
French panel of employed individuals (the “D￩clarations annuelles de donn￩es sociales” - DADS), drawn from 
annual employers‟ reports, does not give information on the reason for individuals‟ absence in a given year or 
period  of  time;  in  addition,  it  does  not  cover  civil  servants.  The  European  panel  EU-SILC,  in  which  France 
participates, provides no retrospective information on either activity history or the number of children an individual 
has had (only the number of children currently living in the household). 
6 More than one situation can be declared for any given year: firstly because some situations are not exclusive 
(for example, studies + unemployment) and secondly because a 6-month period can start in year t and end in 
year t+1 (in which case the interviewers were instructed to tick both years). In these cases, we have divided the 
year by the number of situations identified and imputed to each situation a duration equal to the corresponding 
fraction of year. 
7 Within short spells, whose average duration is 0.7 year for both men and women, it is not possible to distinguish 
employment from non-employment, but they definitely include both. These short spells are then included in actual 
work experience but their effect is isolated in the analysis.  
8 These years of training exclude initial education. Periods of compulsory military service, which was abolished in 
1996, are included in training. 
9 To test the robustness of this definition, two other alternative definitions of child-related time out have been 
used: i) as starting within the year after childbirth; ii) as starting within 6 years of childbirth. The results are only 
marginally affected by the choice of definition.    6 
The number of children is the total number of children that a person has had, not only - as is the case 
with many cross-section datasets - the number currently living in the household. 
The dataset also provides other standard socio-demographic information (education, household type, 
region of residence, health status
10, immigrant status) and for those employed at the time of interview, 
detailed information on the characteristics of the current job (monthly wage, weekly hours, time status, 
occupation, public/private sector, firm size). 
Our dependent variable is the net hourly wage. It is not observed directly but computed on the basis of 
individuals‟  current  monthly  wages  (net  of  social  contributions,  including  overtime  payments  and 
monthly bonuses) and contractual weekly hours of work
11. 
2.2 Descriptive statistics 
We start by looking at how children might affect women‟s and men‟s participation in the labor market, 
working hours, time status, activity history and then wages. The first child-related inequality between 
men and women lies in the fact that among parents, it is mostly women who withdraw from the labor 
force (table 1). In the total population aged 20-49 (excluding students and retired people), about 85 % 
of women participate in the labor force on average, and this percentage decreases with the number of 
children, falling from 98% among childless women to 69% among mothers of 3 and more children. The 
fact of having children has absolutely no such effect on men‟s participation. 
Among wage earners, the gender gap in average weekly hours increases with the number of children, 
because it grows with the number of children for men while decreasing for women. This gap is partly 
explained by part-time work, the incidence of which increases for women with the number of children: 
16 % of childless women work part-time, and respectively 20 %, 34 % and 44 % of mothers of one, 
two and three or more children; part-time hours are very heterogeneous, but a substantial percentage 
(50%  on  average,  60%  in  the  public  sector)  corresponds  to  a  4  or  4.5  day-week.  Other  sample 
characteristics are detailed in appendix 1. 
As  for  experience  and  activity  history,  potential  experience  shows  no  difference  by  gender,  while 
men‟s actual work experience is longer than women‟s by 1.4 years on average (table 2). For both men 
and women, most of this experience has been accumulated with the current employer, as shown by 
the length of tenure, which represents more than half the total length of actual work experience; this 
reflects  the  rather  low  external  mobility  in  France.  However,  the  ratio  of  tenure  to  actual  work 
experience is higher for women than for men (resp. 68% and 64% on average). Women‟s work history 
also differs from men‟s in part-time work experience, almost non-existent for men with any number of 
children, longer and increasing with the number of children for women. 
Gender  differences  are  notable  in  the  length  and  composition  of  time  out  of  employment.  Firstly, 
women face longer spells of unemployment than men, on average as well as with any number of 
children,  and  among  mothers,  unemployment  duration  increases  with  the  number  of  children. 
                                                       
10 Health status is proxied by a variable indicating whether the person has suffered from a serious illness in the 
past or is permanently handicapped. 
11 To obtain hourly wage rates, contractual weekly hours are multiplied by 4.33 (i.e., the average number of weeks 
in a month).   7 
Secondly,  women  also  spend  longer  periods  out  of  the  labor  market  than  men.  Here,  the  largest 
difference  is  in  the  duration  of  child-related  work  interruptions,  which  fathers  do  not  experience 
whereas mothers spend on average almost two years out of the labor market. Men‟s major reason for 
time out of the labor force is related to training. 
Finally, there are substantial differences in raw wages by gender and number of children (table 3). 
Between genders, the gap in hourly wages is about 13% on average - 10 percentage points lower 
than the gap in monthly wages. Childless women do rather well with an average hourly (resp. monthly) 
wage of 95% (resp. 89%) that of men. The gender wage gap increases with the number of children: 
mothers‟ hourly pay relative to fathers‟ varies from 86% with one child to 79% with 3 children, and from 
78% to 64% for monthly wages. 
Table 1 – Participation, weekly hours and part-time work by gender and number of children (%) 
  
Women  Men 
All 
Number of children 
All 
Number of children 
0  1  2  3+ 
Total with 
children  0  1  2  3+ 
Total with 
children 
% in the labor force
a  85.1  97.8  90.4  83.7  68.8  81.4  99.7  99.6  99.9  99.9  99.4  99.8 
Weekly hours
b   32.8  34.2  33.7  32.2  30.6  32.3  37.1  36.3  37.4  37.6  37.3  37.5 
% working part-time
b  27.7  16.0  20.3  34.1  43.5  31.8  3.5  5.8  2.1  3  1.7  2.4 
Source: EFE, 2004-2005.  
a: among individuals aged 20-49 excluding students and retired people. 
b: among wage earners. 
 
Table 2 – Experience and activity history by gender and number of children (average number of years) 
  
Women  Men 
All 
Number of children 
All 
Number of children 
0  1  2  3+ 
Total with 
children  0  1  2  3+ 
Total with 
children 
Potential experience   16.3  8.5  15.8  19.7  22.4  19.1  16.6  9.9  16.9  20.1  22.7  19.8 
Actual work experience   13.7  7.7  14.3  16.8  16.1  15.9  15.2  8.9  15.4  18.6  20.8  18.2 
Incl. tenure  9.3  5.4  9.6  11.6  10.1  10.7  9.7  5.7  10.0  12.1  13.0  11.7 
Incl. part-time work exp.  2.5  0.8  1.7  3.6  4.0  3.1  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3 
Unemployment  0.5  0.3  0.5  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.4  0.3 
Time out, total  1.9  0.5  0.9  2.1  5.2  2.4  0.9  0.6  1.0  1.0  1.2  1.1 
- on training  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.8  0.6  0.9  1.0  1.0  1.0 
- on childcare  1.4  0.0  0.4  1.6  4.6  1.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1 
- other reasons  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0 
N   3101  807  710  1092  492  2294  3131  1023  617  969  522  2108 
 Source: EFE, INED, 2004-2005.  
Population of employees.   8 
 
Table 3 – Raw wages and unadjusted gender and family wage gaps 
 
All 
Number of children 
0  1  2  3+ 
Total with 
children 
Men             
Monthly wage (€)  1724  1496  1734  1861  1903  1835 
Hourly wage  (€)  10.8  9.6  10.8  11.5  12.0  11.4 
Women             
Monthly wage (€)  1313  1338  1350  1310  1224  1304 
Hourly wage  (€)  9.4  9.1  9.3  9.5  9.5  9.5 
  By age group <30
a  8.2  8.2  8.0  8.2
a  -  8.1 
  30 - <39  9.4  10.0  9.4  9.2  9.5  9.3 
  39 - 49  9.9  11.1  10.0  9.9  9.6  9.8 
Gender wage gap (%)             
Monthly wage, all  76.2  89.4  77.9  70.4  64.3  71.1 
Hourly wage, all  87.0  94.8  86.1  82.6  79.2  83.3 
Family wage gap
b (%)             
Monthly wage, all      100.9  97.9  91.5  97.5 
Hourly wage, all      102.2  104.4  104.4  104.4 
  By age group <30
a      98.1  101.5  -  98.8 
  30 - <39      94.4  96.9  104.1  93.0 
  39 - 49      89.7  98.6  97.0  88.3 
Source: EFE, 2004-2005. 
  
a The few observations having 3+ children are included with those having 2 children.  
b Mothers‟ mean wage relative to childless women‟s mean wage.
  
 
Between women, mothers‟ mean monthly pay is lower than that of childless women, but their mean 
hourly pay is higher. This difference illustrates the impact of part-time work among mothers. However, 
the higher mean hourly wage of mothers results essentially from the fact that older women are more 
likely both to earn higher pay and to have more children. Thus, by age group, the average hourly wage 
of mothers is lower than that of childless women, from only slightly among women in their twenties, to 
7% among those in their thirties and about 12% among  women in their forties. These differences 
reflect the fact that children do not have a linear effect over the life cycle. Under the age of 30, a large 
proportion of women (70%) have not (yet) had children and are in the early stages of their careers. In 
their thirties, 82% of women have children; they are further advanced in their careers but are also 
likely to experience difficulties in combining work and childcare and to interrupt their employment – this 
is the age group in which the percentage not in the labor force is the highest (9.6% vs. 7.0% of women 
under 30 and 7.4% of women in their forties). Women in their forties, of whom only about 10% are 
childless,  are  past  the  early  stages  of  motherhood  but  may  be  facing  the  consequences  of  past 
adjustments and interruptions. 
 
3. Estimating the impact of children and child-related time out on individuals’ current wages 
This section addresses the question of the existence and extent of an impact of children on women‟s 
and  men‟s  earnings.  By  “impact  of  children”,  we  mean  either  a  direct  impact,  i.e.,  a  significant   9 
coefficient  on  the  number  of  children  in  the  wage  equation,  or  an  indirect  impact,  i.e.,  significant 
coefficients on variables that can reasonably thought to be related to childcare, for example working 
part-time or having spent time out of the labor force.  
We expect to find a “direct” positive effect and few or no “indirect” effects of children on men‟s wages, 
and negative effects, either direct or indirect, on women‟s. In the case of men, positive returns to 
fatherhood (direct effects of children) would be consistent with the marriage premium regularly found 
in men‟s earnings (Korenman and Neumark, 1991; Gray, 1997; Dougherty, 2006); we do not expect 
indirect  effects  simply  because  men  do  not  seem  to  “adjust”  to  fatherhood  by  changing  their 
employment behavior (Pailhé and Solaz, 2006). In the case of women, it is precisely the contrary; 
motherhood  has  actually  been  found  to  influence  women‟s  earnings  in  two  main  and  essentially 
“indirect” ways
12 (for a detailed review see e.g. Budig and England, 2001). Firstly, working mothers are 
more likely than men or childless women to have spent time out of the labor market, and consequently 
to have accumulated less human capital; these employment breaks may result not only in foregone 
experience but also in an additional penalty resulting from skills atrophy (Mincer and Polachek, 1974). 
Secondly, having children to care for may also influence mothers‟ allocation of effort (Becker, 1985); 
left with less energy than men or childless women, mothers could limit their occupational choices to 
jobs and positions which are compatible with their family responsibilities - seeking “more convenient 
and less energy-intensive jobs” in Becker‟s terms. These adjustments, under the form of working or 
having worked in part-time jobs or in jobs or firms that are more “family-friendly” (or simply closer to 
home or school) may result in reduced work opportunities or, according to the theory of compensating 
differentials, lower pay (Filer, 1985).  
Our  empirical  investigation  is  conducted  by  steps,  starting  with  a  standard  human  capital  wage 
equation  where  the  log  hourly  wage  is  explained  by  human  capital  and  personal  characteristics. 
Regressions are conducted separately for women and for men. 
Human  capital  characteristics  include  a  set  of  8  dummy  variables  indicating  the  highest  diploma 
obtained  by  the  individual (EDUC),  work  experience  (EXP)  and  the  number  of years  with  the  same 
employer (TENURE). For all variables related to experience and for TENURE we adopt a quadratic form. 
The set of personal characteristics includes the number of children
13 (NBCHILD, that we set apart in the 
expressions below since it is one of the variables of interest), and dummy variables for living in a 
couple (either married or not), 3 age groups, immigrant status, health status and area of residence 
(see Appendix 1 for detailed definitions of the variables and sample means). 
In a first step (model 1), experience is implemented as actual work experience (EXP):  
Lwh =   a EDUC + b EXP + c TENURE + i1 NBCHILD + i CONTROLS + e        (1) 
where e is the error term. 
Then in a second step, we extend our approach to experience by taking into account not only work 
experience but also the whole activity history, accounting for the duration and type of employment 
                                                       
12 Aside from unobserved heterogeneity that, as discussed in section 1, we are not able to deal with. 
13 We use the total number of children rather than dummy variables, following Budig and England (2001) who 
found that the simplification did not affect the analysis.   10 
interruptions  (model  2).  In  addition,  the  periods  of  alternation  between  short  spells  employed/not 
employed are taken into account separately (PRECA). It is important to distinguish between different 
types of employment interruption, because although they all result in lower employment experience, 
they  may  not  all  have  the  same  influence  on  wages:  some  are  clearly  expected  to  increase  the 
individual‟s  human  capital  (training),  while  others  (unemployment,  time  out  of  the  labor  force  for 
reasons other than training) are more likely to have a negative impact - either due to skill depreciation 
or signaling effects. Employment interruptions are then divided into:  
-  unemployment (UNEMP),  
-  time-out of the labor force, broken down into child-related (CHILDOUT)
14, training (TRAINING) and 
other reasons (OTHERO), 
and we estimate: 
Lwh =  a EDUC + b EXP + c TENURE + e1 PRECA + e2 UNEMP + f CHILDOUT + g TRAINING + h OTHERO 
+ i1 NBCHILD + i CONTROLS + e                (2) 
In the last step, we incorporate a set of covariates related to the current job characteristics into the 
specification, including especially the time status (PARTIME), public/private sector (PUBLIC) and their 
interaction (PTPUB)
15, and other controls (JOBSET) for having extra hours paid, working conditions (night 
or weekend work), a position of responsibility, the size of the firm and the sector: 
Lwh = a EDUC + b EXP + c TENURE + e1 PRECA + e2 UNEMP + f CHILDOUT + g TRAINING + h OTHERO 
+ j1 PARTIME + j2 PUBLIC + j3 PTPUB + j JOBSET  + i1 NBCHILD + i CONTROLS + e    (3) 
For women, in order to correct for selection in employment, we also estimate models 1‟, 2‟ and 3‟ 
including an additional regressor IMR (the inverse Mills ratio) following Heckman‟s two-steps procedure 
(Heckman, 1979). The IMR is obtained from a probit equation where the dependant variable is “to be 
employed” (vs. “to be inactive”
16) and the explanatory variables are those in model 1
17, plus a dummy 
                                                       
14 Time-out of the labor force to care for children is potentially endogenous, i.e. mothers who have spent time out 
to care for children have the worst prospects on the labor market (Lequien, 2009; Piketty, 2005). This may lead to 
a biased estimate of the return to time out and the conclusion that children have an indirect impact on female 
wage which actually comes from women‟s behavior. The cross-sectional nature of our dataset does not allow to 
control properly for this bias. However, an instrumental variable (IV) approach was used, with religiosity and 
family  background  (number  of  siblings  and  a  dummy  variable  equal  to one  if  the  respondent‟s  parents  have 
divorced or split up) as instruments. The Hausman test does not lead to a rejection of the exogeneity of time-out 
from the labor force to care for children, and the OLS method is therefore more efficient. 
15 We pay special attention to working in the public sector for two reasons. Firstly, because its incidence is higher 
for women than for men. Secondly, because it includes the majority of school teachers, who most often declare  
only the number of hours spent in the classroom as their contractual working hours. This does not include the 
time spent on preparation, marking, etc., which is at least partly acknowledged in the monthly pay, resulting in 
higher apparent hourly wages. We include a crossed-effect of part-time and the public sector to control for the 
specific regime of part-time work in this sector, where “long” part-time hours (4 days out of five and 4.5 days out of 
five) are „overpaid‟ on the basis of resp. 6/7
th and 32/35
th the pay for full-time work, with the result that for a given 
monthly wage, part time hourly pay is higher than in the private sector. 
16 Participation in employment is estimated among individuals who are neither students nor retired. We also 
exclude the self-employed and, given involuntary unemployment that we cannot distinguish and since we want to 
be  able  to  interpret  non-participation  as  „voluntary‟,  we  also exclude  the unemployed  (cf.  Beblo  et  al,  2003). 
Selection into employment is not corrected for in the case of men, because within the population defined above, 
about 100% of men are employed. 
17 In principle (cf. Wooldridge, 2002), the selection equation should include the same set of variables defined on 
the whole sample as in the wage equation (plus at least one exclusion variable, i.e., influencing participation but 
not the wage). However, we do not completely follow this principle, because when activity history is detailed, 
including the same set of variables in the participation equation is equivalent to including the current participation 
status in the explanatory variables. We therefore use potential experience instead.    11 
variable for having at least one child aged under 3 (the age at which children are accepted in public 
pre-school), an indicator of the woman‟s own mother‟s activity history (“always at work” vs. “other 
situations”)  and  the  amount  of  non-work  income  (measured  as  the  household  income  minus 
individual‟s  own  earnings);  these  three  last  variables  are  our  exclusion  variables.  The  estimation 
(detailed results in Appendix 2) shows the expected effects of the presence of small children and 
unearned  income  (both  negative  and  significant)  and  mother‟s  employment  history  (positive  and 
significant: women whose mothers always worked are more likely to be employed). 
Table 4 below presents a summary of the results
18, focusing on children and the variables which are 
most likely to be influenced by children:  EXP and  TENURE, the length of which can be reduced by 
interruptions, CHILDOUT, a measure of past adjustments to having children that may have a negative 
influence, and PARTIME, taken as an indicator of current indirect effects of having children to care for. 
For women, the effect of the number of children is never significant, but when the specification is 
changed the sign of the coefficient changes: it is positive with model 1, negative with model 1‟ (when 
selection into employment is controlled for), then positive again when more information about the past 
influence  of  children  on  the  activity  history  (model  2‟)  and  the  current  influence  on  employment 
characteristics (model 3‟) are taken into account
19. As for the IMR, it is positive and significant in all 
models; this positive sign is as expected, showing that the unobserved characteristics, which influence 
participation, are positively correlated with the wage (i.e., women who have the highest propensity to 
participate have the best unobserved productive characteristics – conversely, women who would be 
the worst off if they were employed are out of the labor force). Considering all these results together 
suggests omitted variables in model 1, while the negative influence of children in model 1‟ indicates an 
effect of factors not accounted for in the human capital variables and other personal characteristics, 
since they are taken into account at this step, i.e., the effect of adjustments to children either in the 
past  (interruptions)  or  in  the  current  employment  characteristics  (part-time)  that  we  introduce  in 
models 2‟ and 3‟. This suggests that our careful accounting of activity history and controls for current 
job characteristics allow to avoid much of the possible endogeneity of the number of children. This 
endogeneity bias, if any, would probably be smaller than in other European countries since fertility 
behavior in France is rather homogeneous
20 and social differentials regar ding fertility behavior are 
smaller (Toulemon  et  al.,  2008)
21. Within this limit, we conclude from this part of our results that 
children have no direct effect on women‟s hourly wages, a conclusion which is consistent with the 
main  expected  effects  of  children  on  wages  in  the  framework  of  human  capital  theory  (“indirect” 
effects, cf. Korenman and Neumark 1992). 
As for the effects of employment interruptions, the estimation shows firstly that child-related time out 
has the negative and significant effect that could be expected, i.e., women who have interrupted their 
                                                       
18 See Appendix 3 for complete regressions. 
19 The effect is the same when the current job c haracteristics are introduced  first and activity history variables 
second. 
20 There is a large concentration of families with 2 children: among women born in 1950, 10% are childless, 20% 
have one child, 40% two children, 20% three children, and 10% have four or more children 
21 Women with higher educational attainment have fewer children on average, but when they do have them, they 
are more likely to have three children than women of medium educational level (Toulemon et al., 2008).   12 
employment for childcare reasons face a specific penalty: one year out on childcare reduces their 
hourly wage by - 2.5% if estimated with model 2‟ and by -2.1% with model 3‟. This penalty comes in 
addition  to  reduced  work  experience  and  possible  reduced  tenure,  the  missing  returns  being, 
respectively, + 1.7% and + 0.9% (+1.6% and +0.6% with model 3‟). Other indirect effects of children 
on women‟s hourly wages appear through part-time work, the incidence of which is twice as high 
among mothers as it is among childless women (cf. table 2); however, the negative influence of part-
time work is largely offset for those working in the public sector. 
None of these effects are observed for men. Firstly, children appear to have a steady positive and 
significant  influence  on  men‟s  hourly  wages.  Secondly,  the  coefficient  on  child-related  time-out  is 
negative but not significant – men just do not interrupt their employment to take charge of childcare. 
Thirdly, the incidence of part-time work among men is too low for it to have any significant impact on 
their hourly wage. 
Table 4 – Estimations of women‟s and men‟s log hourly wage 
  Women    Men   
Model  (1)    (1‟)    (2')    (3‟)    (1)    (2)    (3)   
EXP  0.015  ***  0.015  ***  0.016  ***  0.016  ***  0.033  ***  0.035  ***  0.034  *** 
EXP2*100  -0.024  *  -0.022  *  -0.038  ***  -0.035  ***  -0.076  ***  -0.087  ***  -0.082  *** 
TENURE  0.014  ***  0.013  ***  0.009  ***  0.006  *  0.004    0.000    -0.003   
TENURE2*100  -0.017    -0.016    -0.006    -0.002    0.012    0.020  *  0.022  ** 
NBCHILD  0.007    -0.011    0.005    0.001    0.019  ***  0.017  ***  0.014  *** 
PRECA  .    .    -0.019  ***  -0.015  **  .    -0.022  ***  -0.021  *** 
PRECA2*100  .    .    0.145  ***  0.097  *  .    0.104  ***  0.095  ** 
UNEMP  .    .    -0.044  ***  -0.038  ***  .    -0.073  ***  -0.069  *** 
UNEMP2*100  .    .    0.356  ***  0.322  ***  .    0.687  ***  0.695  *** 
CHILDOUT  .    .    -0.025  ***  -0.021  ***  .    -0.018    -0.026   
CHILDOUT2*100  .    .    0.110  ***  0.096  ***  .    0.222    0.275   
TRAINING  .    .    0.025  *  0.011    .    0.009    0.005   
TRAINING2*100  .    .    -0.214    -0.048    .    0.021    0.095   
OTHERO  .    .    -0.023  **  -0.017  *  .    -0.069  ***  -0.057  ** 
OTHERO2*100  .    .    0.103  *  0.084    .    0.406  **  0.368  * 
PARTIME  .    .    .    -0.027  *  .    .    0.026   
PUBLIC  .    .    .    0.035  **  .    .    0.052  ** 
PTPUB  .    .    .    0.071  ***  .    .    0.003   
PAIDHSUP  .    .    .    0.142  ***  .    .    0.087  *** 
RESP  .    .    .    0.104  ***  .    .    0.104  *** 
IMR  .    0.140  ***  0.119  ***  0.112  ***  .    .    .   
JOBSET  .    .    .    X    .    .    X   
EDUC  X    X    X    X    X    X    X   
CONTROLS  X    X    X    X    X    X    X   
Intercept  1.579  ***  1.558  ***  1.712  ***  1.778  ***  1.662  ***  1.763  ***  1.771  *** 
R-sq  0.41    0.42    0.43    0.49    0.44    0.45    0.49   
Observations  3101    3101    3101    3101    3131    3131    3131   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
X indicates a variable or set of variables included in the regression.  
See detailed results in Appendix 3. 
Aside from the influence of children, the other results of the estimations of men‟s and women‟s hourly 
wages are similar to those usually found in the literature (Bayet, 1996; Colin, 1999 for the French 
case). With any specification, returns to experience appear lower for women than for men (by about 
one  half), reflecting that  women‟s careers are flatter than  men‟s. Returns to tenure  are higher for   13 
women; this suggests that staying with the same employer is more rewarding for women than for 
men, or that mobility is more penalizing for women. However, these returns decrease steadily when 
activity history then job characteristics are introduced and, all in all, even with the same employer, a 
year in employment is less rewarding for women than for men. 
Among  employment  interruptions,  the  most  penalizing  is  unemployment:  the  fact  of  having  been 
unemployed has a marked negative impact on women‟s as well as men‟s hourly wages, this time more 
pronounced for men than  for women, as found previously  by  Bayet (1996). Periods  of precarious 
employment  also  have  a  negative  and  significant  influence  on  women‟s  and  men‟s  wages.  For 
women, unemployment is more penalizing than child-related time out, suggesting that different types 
of employment interruption convey different signals
22. The effect of time spent out of the labor force for 
reasons other than training or childcare is negative and significant for both women and men, and more 
penalizing on men‟s wages; for women, the magnitude of the coefficient is smaller than that on child-
related time-out, while for men it is close to that of unemployment
23. Interestingly, time out on training 
seems to have no significant impact on men‟s hourly wages, while it is weakly significant in the case of 
women with model 2‟ (i.e. when the current job‟s characteristics are not taken into account); given that 
women spend on average less time in training than men, this could be interpreted as a signaling effect 
or a selection into training. 
Adding controls for current employment characteristics (model 3) tends to reduce slightly all the other 
coefficients, but especially those on children
24 and on time out variables for both women and men (for 
women, time out on training  becomes non-significant). The coefficients on job characteristics are of 
the expected signs: working part-time is negative for women (not significant for men), working in the 
public sector has a positive effect for all, and for women working part -time in the public sector has the 
positive impact that could be expected. The effect of having been paid extra hours or a position of 
responsibility is positive and significant for all, extra hours yielding higher returns for women than for 
men – this could be related to the fact that for women extra hours are more likely to happen within a 
higher occupational status, whereas they are more generalized in the case of men. 
At this point, the main results are 1) that children have no direct impact on women‟s hourly wage but a 
positive one on men‟s, 2) that the reward for a year in employment is higher for men than for women, 
3)  that  for  types  of  time  out  which  are  common  to  women  and  men,  a  year  out  appears  more 
penalizing to men‟s than to women‟s wages. But women face additional penalties for part-time work 
(which can reasonably be taken, at least partly, as an effect of having children) and for time out on 
childcare; multiplied by the fact that, on average, they work more often in part-time jobs and spend 
                                                       
22 However in general, the penalty for time out on childcare will be greater because women spend on average 
more time out on childcare than in unemployment. It cannot be excluded  that mothers (especially mothers of 
younger children) having difficulties in finding jobs may tend to withdraw from the labor market. 
23 Since we do not know the „other reasons‟, it is difficult to provide an explanation. However, it cannot be ruled 
out, especially for women, that time out for „other reasons‟ is actually related to care – either for children if the 
interruption starts later than the three years after childbirth by which we have defined child-related time out, or for 
parents or relatives. For both sexes, it may also correspond, at least partly, to discouraged workers. 
24 Better controls on job characteristics also have effects on the apparent premium to family life for men: aside 
from the reduced coefficient on children, living in a couple becomes non-significant (see Appendix 3). This would 
support the hypothesis of selection of higher wage-earning men into family life (cf. Korenman and Neumark, 1991; 
Gray, 1997).   14 
more years out  of the labor force for reasons related to children than men do, this suggests that 
children are actually a key factor behind the gender wage gap. Moreover, the substantial impact of 
doing  extra  hours  or  having  a  position  of  responsibility  suggests  possible  missed  opportunities  of 
higher wages for mothers – if children prevent them from working extra hours or reaching positions of 
responsibility,  or  if  employers  consider  women  as  potential  mothers  and  therefore  less  reliable  or 
committed workers.  
 
4. The gender wage gap and the “interruption gap” 
In this last section of the paper, we turn to a decomposition of the gender wage gap in which we seek 
to isolate the impact of children. As seen above, the main effect of children on women‟s wages is an 
indirect negative effect, resulting from the combination of reduced experience and a penalty on time 
out, while for men there is a direct positive effect. To take this gender asymmetry into account, we 
consider three subgroups: men, women with continuous participation in the labor force, and women 
with child-related interruptions. The gender wage gap is then analyzed as resulting from two sorts of 
pay differentials: 
-  firstly,  an  “interruption  pay  gap”  between  women  with  continuous  or  interrupted  workforce 
participation;  here,  our  approach  is  in  a  way  based  on  that  of  the  family  pay  gap,  in  that  the 
decomposition includes a comparison between women; but unlike the family gap approach, we do not 
make a comparison between mothers and childless women, but between women who have and have 
not taken time out for childcare. 
-  secondly,  a  “gender”  pay  gap  between  men  and  the  group  of  women  who  have  continuously 
participated in the labor force (whether they are mothers or not)
25. 
The analysis is conducted on individuals aged between 39 and 49 years. This restriction presents 
several  advantages.  Firstly,  it  provides  a  more  homogen eous  group,  as  these  workers  have 
experienced the same labor market conditions and are observed at the same stage of their lifecycle. 
Secondly, it allows to compare women who are likely to have already  completed their fertility
26. In 
addition, the rate of activity of women in this age group is high: women who have returned work when 
their children are grown up are  joining those who have had uninterrupted careers (86% of women in 
this age group are active in the EFE), and so the impact of their activity history on their current wages 
can be more accurately measured. 
 
4.1. Characteristics of men and women between 39 and 49 years old 
                                                       
25 In  a  similar  spirit,  Manning and  Swafffield  (2008),  for  the  British case,  compared  men  and  women  with a 
continuous full-time employment, no children and no desire to have any. 
26 In 2004, the partial total fertility rate, i.e., the number of births per 100 women during a given age span, was 
6.4% for women aged 40 and over, compared to 64.3% for women aged 25-29 and 60.4% for those aged 30-34 
[Insee, Bilan démographique].   15 
The  subsample  of  wage  earners  aged  between  39  and  49  is  composed  of  1360  men  and  1356 
women, of whom 781 (58%) have never interrupted their activity to care for children and 575 (42%) 
have taken time out of the labor market for this reason. The interesting point is that, among women in 
this age group, a large majority (85 %) of those who have never interrupted their activity are mothers 
and a meaningful proportion of mothers have never interrupted their workforce participation. The big 
difference between those who have taken time out from the labor market and those who have not is in 
the number of children they have (Table 5): at one end, only 10% of mothers who have taken child-
related time out have only had one child, compared to 32 % of those without interruption; at the other 
end, 44 % and 14 % respectively have had three children or more. 
Table 5 – Children and child-related career interruptions among employed mothers  
aged 39-49 (%). 
  Number of children 
  1  2  3 +  Total 
Interruption  10.4  45.2  44.3  575 
No interruption  32.4  53.3  14.4  646 
Total  269  604  348  1221 
Source: EFE, INED, 2004-2005. 
The two groups of women also differ in their education level and experience (see Table 6 part a). 
Women without child-related interruptions are more educated, with 19% having at least 3 years of 
higher education compared to only 12% of the other women. This gap is consistent with human capital 
theory,  which  predicts  that  less-educated  women  are  more  prone  to  interrupt  their  participation  in 
employment  (Mincer  and  Polachek,  1974)
27.Quite logically, the length of actual work experience 
(Table 6, part b.) is longest among women without career interruption (around 23 years) and  shortest 
among those who have taken time out (18 years on average, decreasing steadily with the number of 
children). Childless women have a shorter actual experience than the average “continuers” (21 years), 
this being due to late entrance into the labor market related to their longer studies. Not surprisingly, 
the difference in average actual experience within the group of women is mostly due to time spent out 
of the labor market caring for children. Tenure represents a large proportion of actual experience for 
women without career interruption (around 72%). The smaller ratio of tenure to experience for women 
with career interruption (around 60%) probably stems from those who did not return to their previous 
employer when returning to work. 
As for hourly wages (table 7), the gender differential is, as could be expected, much larger between 
men and the group of women with interruptions (26%) than between men and the group of women 
with continuous participation (10%); it is 20% on average between men and all women. The hourly 
wage of mothers of 3+ children with no interruption is very close to that of men, reflecting their higher 
level of education, but otherwise the gender wage differential does not vary much with the number of 
children. Finally, the raw “interruption” gap (between women with and without interruption) amounts to 
                                                       
27 Among the "continuers”, the most educated group are childless: 28% have at least 3 years of higher education. 
But the next most educated group is that of women with 3 children or more: 26% have at least 3 years of higher 
education.   16 
19%, which is consistent with the negative return to time out of the labor market found in the previous 
section.  
Table 6. Education and activity history, population aged 39-49 
  Women  Men 
  With interruption  Without interruption   
  All  Number of children  All  Number of children   
    1  2  3+    0  1  2  3+   
a. Education 
5 yrs + higher education  4.9  6.7  5.0  4.3  7.2  13.3  4.3  6.1  8.6  8.4 
3-4 yrs higher education  7.3  5.0  7.3  7.8  12.4  14.8  8.6  12.5  17.2  7.6 
Up to 2 yrs higher education  8.7  6.7  9.6  8.2  12.2  13.3  11.0  12.8  10.8  7.6 
Secondary general education  10.4  8.3  11.2  10.2  10.5  12.6  9.6  10.8  8.6  4.6 
Secondary professional 
education  7.7  5.0  7.3  8.6  8.8  5.2  11.0  9.0  8.6  6.1 
Vocational diploma  28.5  25.0  33.5  24.3  28.9  23.7  32.5  29.9  24.7  40.2 
Primary level  9.6  15.0  10.0  7.8  7.0  4.4  11.0  6.7  3.2  9.0 
No diploma  23.0  28.3  16.2  28.6  12.9  12.6  12.0  12.2  18.3  16.5 
 
b. Experience and Activity history                     
Actual exp  17.9  20.3  18.8  16.5  23.0  20.9  23.8  23.2  23.4  23.0 
Incl. Tenure  10.8  12.0  11.8  9.5  16.6  15.2  16.8  17.1  15.9  14.9 
Unemployment  0.9  0.7  1.0  0.8  0.6  0.9  0.6  0.6  0.5  0.4 
Time out: 
- on training  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.4  0.4  1.0 
- on childcare  5.4  3.0  4.5  7.0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
- other reason  0.5  0.8  0.4  0.4  0.2  0.7  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.1 
% tenure in actual exp  0.60  0.59  0.63  0.58  0.72  0.73  0.71  0.74  0.68  0.65 
Interruption ratio  0.81  0.86  0.81  0.81             
N  575  60  260  255  781  135  209  344  93  1360 
Source: EFE, INED, 2004-2005. 
Table 7. Hourly wages (euros) - Population aged 39-49 
    Number of children  Total 
with 
  All  0  1  2  3+  children 







Women with interruption  8.8  -  9.4  8.6  8.8  8.8 




























(a) ratio of hourly wage of women with career interruption vs. men 
(b) ratio of hourly wage of women without career interruption vs. men 
(c) ratio of hourly wage of women with career interruption vs. women without career interruption 
Source: EFE, INED, 2004-2005. 
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To investigate the link between children and child-related interruptions and the gender wage gap, we 
consider that the gender wage gap results from the addition of the interruption gap between women 
and the gap between men and the group of women who have had no career interruption.  
We start by writing the “interruption” wage gap as follows: 
W f = (1-k) W f1 + k W f2                 (i) 
where f1 and f2 are respectively the women without and with interruption, and k is the share of women 
who have interrupted their careers, 
then we replace W f  in the general expression of the gender wage gap: 
mm f W W W  - [(1-k) W f1 + k W f2], 
which is equivalent to  mm f W W W  - W f1  + k (W f1 - W f2)        (ii) 
On this basis, we decompose (W f1  - W f2), the “interruption wage gap” and (W m - W f1)  the “gender 
wage  gap”  using  the  standard  Oaxaca-Ransom  method  (Oaxaca  &  Ransom,  1994).  For  each 
differential, the estimated average wage gap is as follows: 
1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ' ( ) ' ( ) ( ) g g g g g g g g W W X X X X         (iii) 
where g1 and g2 stand for any pair of groups - their value is respectively (m, f1) and (f1, f2),  X gi  is 
the average characteristics of each group and  ˆ gi their estimated returns. ˆ  represents the “norm”, 
i.e.  ideally  the  return  to  productive  characteristics  on  a  perfect  competitive  market  with  no  wage 
discrimination. Following Oaxaca and Ransom (1994), we estimate  ˆ  from the wage equation of the 
pooled  sample  of  men  and  all  women  as  the  more  “neutral”  measure  of  returns  to  variables;  for 
consistency we use the same vector of returns in both parts of the decomposition. 
The  first  two  terms  in  (iii)  correspond  to  the  so-called  “unexplained”  gap,  that  is  the  differential 
between  ˆ gi  the  returns  of  each  group  and  ˆ   the  returns  of  the  “norm”.  The  first  term  in  (iii) 
corresponds to the “advantage” of group 1, the second term to the “disadvantage” of group 2 and their 
sum total accounts for the “unexplained” part of the wage gap. The last term in (iii) is the “explained” 
part  of  the  gap,  which  results  from  differences  in  the  characteristics  of  the  two  groups.  These 
differences are valued at the estimated returns of the norm. 
As in the previous section, women‟s  wage equations are corrected for  selection into employment, 
following the Heckman two-step procedure. The selection equation is estimated on the sub-sample of 
women aged 39-49  years, using the same specification as previously, except that  we replace the 
variable "at least one child under 3 years old" by "at least one child under 6 years old", to take into 
account the fact that women in this age group are more likely to have “older” children
28. The results of 
the probit equation are given in Appendix 2. 
                                                       
28 In this age group, only 47 women, of which 19 are employed, have at least one child under 3 years old, 
whereas 135, of which 95 are employed, have at least one child under 6 years old.   18 
This correction results in an additional term, ( g1 IMRg1 -  g2 IMRg2), in expression (iii), where IMRgi is the 
Inverse Mills Ratio and  gi the estimated coefficients (Neuman and Oaxaca, 1998). For men, the IMR is 
equal to zero. 
The decomposition is performed on the wage gap adjusted for selection,  i.e., the estimated wage 
differential  minus  the  average  selection  component  for  women.  Each  adjusted  “sub-gap”  can  be 
written as follows: 
AWg1 – AWg2 = (Wg1 – W g2) – ( g1 IMRg1 -  g2 IMRg2)             (iv) 
We use four sets of covariates in the wage equations. The specifications are the same as in section 3, 
with an additional specification (model 4) in which we introduce the occupational status, since it may 
be correlated with past interruptions. Table 8 below summarizes the specifications; the detailed results 
of the regressions are presented in Appendices 5a and 5b.  
Table 8 – Specifications used in decompositions 
Set of variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Human capital  X  X  X  X 
Personal characteristics  X  X  X  X 
Activity History    X  X  X 
Current Job Characteristics      X  X 
Occupations        X 
Correction for selection 
bias  X  X  X  X 
 
4.3. Results  
We look firstly at the “interruption” wage gap, defined here as the hourly wage gap between women 
who have not (f1)  / who have (f2) interrupted their careers to care for children (table 9). This gap 
amounts  to  0.202  (log  points).  The  selectivity  component  is  negative  with  any  specification  and 
approximately equal to 0.05 (log points). The estimated coefficient of the IMR is higher for women with 
career interruptions than for “continuers”, which suggests that women who interrupted and went back 
in employment are probably more productive than those who remain out of the labor market. But the 
selectivity effect is of limited size and the standard errors are large. 
The explained part of the “interruption” gap equals 0.130 (log), i.e., more than half (52%) the estimated 
wage  differential  (adjusted  for  selection  effect)  in  model  1  and  rises  to  more  than  84%  when  the 
activity history is introduced (model 2)
29. Conversely, the unexplained part is small (48% with model 1 
and 16% 20% with model 2) and significant only in model 1. In other words, the interruption gap is 
mostly due to differences in the observed characteristics, especially once work history is taken into 
                                                       
29  These  results  hold  with  alternative  norms:  when  the  norm  is  defined  as  the  group  of  women  with  career 
interruptions, the explained part is equal to 72% in model 1, 87% in model 2, 88% in model 3 and 96% in model 4; 
when the norm is defined as all the women, the explained part is equal to 70%, 84%, 85% and 87% respectively. 
Note that the norm based on the group of women without interruptions cannot be used here, because we need to 
be able to compute the return to child-related time out of the labor market.   19 
account. There is a rather small additional penalty for interrupted careers in terms of differences of 
returns to productive characteristics
30. 
 
Table 9 – Decomposition of the “interruption” wage gap  
   Model 1     Model 2     Model 3     Model 4    
 Raw differential (Lwh)   0.202    0.202    0.202    0.202   
 Differential due  
-0.046    -0.034    -0.046    -0.040    to the selection variable  
 Standard error    0.036    0.036    0.034    0.034   
 Differential adjusted for selection   0.248    0.236    0.248    0.242   
 Standard error    0.042     0.054     0.041     0.041    
a. Components 
   %     %     %     %  of the adjusted wage gap 
 Explained   0.130  52.4  0.199  84.3  0.207  83.5  0.205  84.5 
 Standard  error    0.018    0.021    0.021    0.021   
 Unexplained   0.118  47.6  0.037  15.6  0.041  16.5  0.037  15.4 
 Standard error    0.038    0.045     0.036     0.036    









of the explained part    expl. part   expl. part   expl. part   expl. part 
 Education   0.066  50.8  0.059  29.7  0.055  26.6  0.031  15.2 
 Standard  error    0.013    0.012    0.012    0.007   
 Experience, tenure   0.083  63.8  0.045  22.6  0.038  18.4  0.037  18.1 
 Standard  error    0.009    0.012    0.011    0.010   
 Children   -0.023  -17.7  -0.023  -11.6  -0.015  -7.2  -0.012  -5.9 
 Standard  error    0.006    0.006    0.006    0.005   
 Personal characteristics   0.004  3.1  0.006  3.0  0.005  2.4  0.004  1.7 
 Standard  error   0.004    0.003    0.003    0.002   
Interruptions due to children      0.084  42.2  0.064  30.9  0.049  24.0 
Standard  error      0.017    0.017    0.015   
Other interruptions      0.028  14.1  0.022  10.5  0.017  8.3 
Standard  error      0.005    0.005    0.004   
 Current Job characteristics           0.038  18.4  0.026  12.7 
 Standard  error           0.007    0.007   
Occupations              0.053  25.9 
Standard  error              0.008   
Nobs  1356  100.0  1356  100.1   1356  99.9   1356  100.0 
Standard errors are estimated by bootstraps (1000 replications) 
 
More precisely, the largest part of the explained component corresponds to differences in the length 
and composition of activity history. Child-related time out of the labor market constitutes almost half of 
the  explained  gap  (42%).  The  two  other  largest  components  are  the  differences  in  the  level  of 
                                                       
30 The return to time spent out of the labor market to raise children in the pooled sample is close to the return 
estimated for the group of women with career interruptions, because very few men (36 individuals) have taken 
time out for children. So the difference in returns between the norm and the estimated return is close to zero and 
the effect of this dimension in the unexplained part of the wage decomposition within women is negligible.   20 
education (30%) and work experience (23%). The wage gap between the two groups of women is 
then due not only to the reduced length of work experience but also to the negative return to time 
spent out of labor market to care for children. These two factors (work experience and interruptions for 
children) taken together represent two thirds of the "interruption" wage gap.  
The explained part of the gap does not vary much when the current job characteristics are controlled 
for (model 3). Differences in job characteristics account for 18% of the explained component. The 
difference due to time out of the labor market is reduced to 31% of the explained gap, but the part due 
to  experience  and  time  out  of  the  labor  market  still  represents  about  one  half  of  the  raw  wage 
differential.  Finally,  the  average  difference  in  occupations  represents  26%  of  the  interruption  gap 
(model 4); this suggests that women without interruption have reached on average better occupational 
status  than  women  with  career  breaks.  But  the  share  explained  by  time  out  of  the  labor  market 
remains  close  to  the  level  in  model  3  (24%)  and  the  total  of  differences  in  time  out  and  work 
experience amounts to 42% of the wage differential in this last specification. 
The explained part of the wage differential due to the number of children is small (- .01 log points in 
model 4). It is negative and significant in all models, because the return to children is positive when 
estimated at the norm and women taking time out have on average more children.  
Secondly, using the same four specifications, we decompose the gender wage gap between men and 
women without labor force interruption; this gap is equal to 10.2 (log points). The results are reported 
in table 10. Here the component due to selectivity is even smaller than in the previous decomposition 
(-0.02 log points in model 1, negligible in model 4) and never significant. 
In models 1 and 2, the unexplained part is higher than the estimated differential (resp. 136% and 
112%). In other words, women who have never taken child-related time out of the labor force would be 
paid more than men if they were getting the same returns to their productive characteristics. When 
current job characteristics are taken into account in the wage equations (model 3), the unexplained 
part falls to 76% and the explained part of the wage differential becomes positive. This shows that a 
substantial share of the hourly wage differential between these two groups results from differences in 
employment characteristics. Some of them, related to differences in industry sector or firm size can be 
interpreted as reflecting horizontal gender segregation; others such as working conditions, part-time 
work or overtime hours can be viewed as reflecting an unequal commitment to work – whether or not 
related to children. But all these factors together explain only a quarter of the wage differential and 
controlling for occupations does not substantially change the picture: the explained part rises to 31%, 
and 68% of the wage gap remains unexplained by the differences in observable characteristics
31.  
                                                       
31 Here again, we have tested the robustness of these results using alternative norms. Taking women without 
career interruption as the norm, the unexplained part is equal to 153% in model 1, 129% in model 2, 93% in 
model 3 and 106% in model 4; taking men and women without career interruption as the norm, the unexplained 
part is equal to 137%, 113%, 75% and 67% respectively.   
   21 
Table 10 - Decomposition of the gender wage gap  
between men and women with no child-related interruption 
   Model 1     Model 2     Model 3     Model 4    
Total wage differential  
0.102     0.102     0.102     0.102     between men and women 
Differential  
-0.024    -0.021    -0.009    0.000    due to the selection variable 
Standard error   0.022    0.022    0.020    0.017   
Differential  
0.127    0.123    0.111    0.102    Adjusted for selection 
Standard error   0.029    0.028    0.027    0.026   
Explained  -0.045  -35.5  -0.015  -12.1  0.027  24.5  0.032  31.4 
Standard  error   0.013    0.014    0.015    0.016   
inc. Children  0.010    0.010    0.006    0.005   
Standard  error  0.003    0.003    0.002    0.002   
inc. Occupations              0.004   
Standard  error                    0.009    
Unexplained  0.172  135.5  0.138  112.1  0.0839  75.5  0.070  68.5 
Standard error   0.027    0.025    0.024    0.021   
Nobs  2141     2141     2141     2141    
Standard errors are estimated by bootstraps (1000 replications) 
 
It is interesting to note that the explained part due to the number of children is positive and significant 
– salaried men have on average more children than women without time out and are rewarded for it – 
but it represents only a very limited part of the gender wage gap (0.009 log points in model 1, 0.005 
log points in model 4). 
To sum up, most of the gender wage gap between men and women continuously in the labor force is 
unexplained. This result is consistent with Moschion and Muller (2010) who, applying our approach to 
data restricted to the private sector, find that two-thirds of the hourly wage gap between men and 
women without career interruptions remain unexplained by differences in productive characteristics. 
Finally, the total gender wage gap, equal to 0.188,  is composed of an “interruption” gap (weighted by 
the proportion of women with career interruptions, equal to 0.424), a “gender” wage gap between men 
and women without child-related employment interruptions and a selection effect which is negligible in 
all models (see table 11). With the most parsimonious model (model 1), the total unexplained part is 
nearly equal to the adjusted wage gap (96%). It then falls to 69% with model 2, when the activity 
history is taken into account. It is only when job characteristics are introduced in model 3 that it drops 
to less than half the total adjusted gender wage gap (47% with model 3 and 42% with model 4). The 
part due to interruptions for children accounts for about 10% (model 1) and 6% (model 4) of the overall 
gender wage gap, which is rather small.    22 
Table 11 - Components of the total gender gap 
  Model 1     Model 2     Model 3     Model 4    
Observed wage differential  0,188       0,188       0,188       0,188      
selection effect  -0,044    -0,035    -0,029    -0,017   
Differential adjusted for selection                 
Components:  0,232    0,223    0,216    0,205  % 
unexplained  0,222  95,6  0,153  68,8  0,101  46,8  0,086  53.2 
explained   0,010  4,4  0,069  31,2  0,115  53,2  0,119  46.8 
Incl. child-related interruptions   0,000  -0,02  0,035  15,9  0,027  12,6  0,020  8.2 
Nobs  2716    2716    2716    2716   
 
More importantly, this decomposition shows that, even though women who have never interrupted 
their activity are very close to men in their productive characteristics, they get lower returns to these 
characteristics than men. This suggests that women with continuous participation in the labor force 
cannot convey a credible signal to employers of their long-term commitment to work, or that employers 
are not ready to decipher the signal. Consequently, their wages are determined “as if” they were likely 
to interrupt their careers. This supports an interpretation of the gender wage gap in terms of statistical 




Children and resulting career interruptions have long been cited as one of the major causes of the 
gender wage gap. Time spent out of the labor market to care for children may result not only in women 
accumulating less professional experience than men on average, but also in a specific pay penalty. By 
using the new French survey “Families and Employers” (Ined, 2005), we have been able to measure 
the impact on current wages of the different components of activity history.  
We first look at men‟s and women‟s returns to observable characteristics. The cross-sectional results 
are essentially consistent with studies in other countries, pointing at adjustments related to unequally 
shared family responsibilities. Children do not influence women‟s hourly wages directly, but may have 
various indirect effects on hourly wages if they cause their mothers to work part-time, interrupt their 
careers or adjust by not  working extra hours or by avoiding (or being excluded from) positions of 
responsibility. The main difference from other studies, especially those on Anglo-American countries, 
is that we do not find any direct negative impact of children on women‟s mean hourly wage when time 
out of employment and job characteristics are taken into account. Our data do not allow to go much 
farther into the reasons for this difference, but we can at least mention some institutional features that 
might account for it: the minimum wage, which is higher in France than the average hourly wage in 
many  countries  and  which  covers  all  occupations  and  sectors  of  industry;  public  pre-schools  that 
accept almost all children from 3 years old (97% in 2002), the substantial (though insufficient) supply 
of all-day childcare and advantageous tax schemes for using personal childcare services.   23 
We then decompose the gender wage over a sample of men and women aged 39-49 in order to focus 
on a homogeneous group. Our results indicate that the wage gap between women who have never 
interrupted their participation in the labor market and women who have taken time out for childcare is 
almost entirely “explained” by their observable characteristics, while the wage gap between men and 
women who have never interrupted their participation in the labor market is mostly “unexplained”. In 
other words, the wage penalty associated with the “interruption” gap between women corresponds to 
differences in human capital, length of work experience and time out to care for children. Conversely, 
women who have remained in the labor force, whether they have children or not, are disadvantaged in 
term  of  returns  to  their  productive  characteristics  when  compared  with  men.  These  results  are 
compatible  with  an  explanation  of  the  gender  wage  gap  in  terms  of  statistical  discrimination,  i.e., 
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Appendix 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable  Definition  Women  Men 
    Mean  Std. D.  Mean  Std. D. 
WAGEM  Monthly wage (net)  1312.8  634.3  1723.9  991.7 
WAGEH  Hourly wage  9.37  4.40  10.83  6.00 
NBH  Number of worked hours by week  32.82  7.56  37.07  6.49 
DIPL1  5 yrs + higher education  0.09  0.28  0.10  0.30 
DIPL2  3-4 yrs higher education  0.15  0.35  0.09  0.28 
DIPL3  Up to 2 yrs higher education  0.16  0.36  0.11  0.31 
DIPL4  Secondary general education  0.08  0.27  0.05  0.21 
DIPL5  Secondary professional education  0.11  0.32  0.11  0.32 
DIPL6  Vocational diploma  0.24  0.43  0.35  0.48 
DIPL7  Primary level  0.06  0.24  0.07  0.26 
DIPL8  No diploma  0.11  0.32  0.12  0.33 
EXPP  Potential experience  16.31  9.15  16.57  9.11 
EXP  Actual experience  13.74  8.34  15.17  8.59 
TENURE  Tenure  9.73  8.11  9.28  7.98 
PRECA  # years short spells job or 
unemployment 
0.66  1.74  0.68  1.92 
UNEMP  # years of unemployment  0.55  1.37  0.30  0.87 
CHILDOUT  # years OLF related to childcare  1.39  3.26  0.04  0.40 
TRAINING  # years OLF for training  0.30  0.76  0.83  1.08 
OTHERO  # years OLF for other reasons  0.19  0.98  0.06  0.43 
NBCHILD  Number of children  1.45  1.13  1.37  1.20 
COUPLE  Living in couple (either married or 
not) 
0.77  0.42  0.78  0.42 
AGE1  <30 years  0.22  0.42  0.23  0.42 
AGE2  30 –  <39 years  0.34  0.47  0.34  0.47 
AGE3  39-49   0.44  0.50  0.43  0.50 
IMMI  Immigrant  0.06  0.24  0.07  0.25 
HEALTH  Health problem  0.13  0.33  0.12  0.33 
IDF  Parisian Region  0.19  0.39  0.18  0.39 
PARTIME  Part-time   0.27  0.45  0.04  0.18 
PUBLIC  Public sector  0.33  0.47  0.21  0.41 
PTPUB  Part time in public sector  0.09  0.28  0.01  0.09 
PAIDHSUP  Paid extra working hours   0.04  0.20  0.09  0.28 
RESP  Supervision  0.17  0.37  0.32  0.47 
FIRM1  Firm size: 0-19  0.35  0.48  0.28  0.45 
FIRM2  Firm size: 20-49  0.15  0.36  0.14  0.35 
FIRM3  Firm size:50-199  0.22  0.41  0.24  0.43 
FIRM4  Firm size: 200-499  0.13  0.33  0.14  0.35 
FIRM5  Firm size: 500-999  0.06  0.24  0.07  0.26 
FRIM6  Firm size : 1000 & +  0.10  0.30  0.12  0.33 
SECT1  Agriculture, industry, building  0.15  0.35  0.39  0.49 
SECT2  Transportation. energy  0.03  0.16  0.09  0.28 
SECT3  Trade. Private services   0.27  0.44  0.18  0.39 
SECT4  Finance, real estate, corporate 
services 
0.13  0.33  0.12  0.32 
SECT5  Education, Health, Administration  0.43  0.49  0.22  0.41 
EVENING  Regular work on evenings  0.15  0.35  0.20  0.40 
SUNDAYR  Regular work on Sundays  0.13  0.33  0.12  0.32 
SUNDAYO  Occasional work on Sundays  0.15  0.36  0.22  0.41 
NIGHT  Regular night work  0.04  0.21  0.12  0.32 
OCC1  Managers and professionals  0.12  0.32  0.18  0.38 
OCC2  Middle management and  0.28  0.45  0.27  0.44   27 
technicians 
OCC3  Clerks  0.50  0.50  0.14  0.35 
OCC4  Workers  0.10  0.30  0.41  0.49 
CHILD3  Children aged under 3  0.13  0.34  0.17  0.38 
MOTHEXP  Own mother always in employment  0.40  0.49  0.39  0.49 
OTHINC  Other income of the household  1605.5  2425.9  1178.6  2336.3 






Appendix 2: Selection equation (employed vs. inactive) 
 
Dept var.  All women   Std E  Women aged 
39-49 
Std E 
DIPL1  1.381***  (0.17)  0.877***  (3.68) 
DIPL2  1.264***  (0.133)  0.827***  (4.56) 
DIPL3  1.169***  (0.121)  0.954***  (5.26) 
DIPL4  0.790***  (0.129)  0.697***  (4.18) 
DIPL5  0.776***  (0.114)  1.002***  (4.86) 
DIPL6  0.524***  (0.083)  0.632***  (5.28) 
DIPL7  0.157  (0.112)  0.099  (0.70) 
EXPP  -0.041*  (0.022)  -0.151*  (1.75) 
EXPP2  0.001***  (0.001)  0.003*  (1.92) 
NBCHILD  -0.354***  (0.032)  -0.235***  (6.07) 
CHILD3  -0.888***  (0.074)     
CHILD6      -0.471***  (3.44) 
COUPLE  0.039  (0.088)  -0.075  (0.56) 
AGE1  -0.421**  (0.179)     
AGE2  -0.019  (0.106)     
IMMI  -0.516***  (0.098)  -0.398***  (2.93) 
HEALTH  -0.193**  (0.081)  -0.211**  (2.00) 
IDF  0.267***  (0.081)  0.192  (1.64) 
ACTM  0.170***  (0.06)  0.144  (1.58) 
O_INCO  -0.000***  (0.00)  -0.000***  (7.16) 
O_INCO2  0.000***  (0.00)  0.000***  (6.14) 
CONSTANT  1.932***  -0.294  3.288***  (2.97) 
Observations  3787     1625   
Pseudo R2  0.28   0.17  
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   28 
Appendix 3: OLS Regressions 
  Women  Men 
  (1)  (1‟)  (2‟)  (3‟)  (1)  (2)  (3) 
DEPT VAR  lwh  lwh  lwh  lwh  lwh  lwh  lwh 
DIPL1  0.713***  0.752***  0.682***  0.597***  0.792***  0.743***  0.684*** 
  (0.028)  (0.031)  (0.034)  (0.032)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.031) 
DIPL2  0.589***  0.629***  0.562***  0.486***  0.546***  0.508***  0.486*** 
  (0.023)  (0.027)  (0.030)  (0.028)  (0.030)  (0.031)  (0.031) 
DIPL3  0.404***  0.446***  0.389***  0.341***  0.383***  0.344***  0.319*** 
  (0.020)  (0.026)  (0.028)  (0.026)  (0.023)  (0.024)  (0.023) 
DIPL4  0.273***  0.302***  0.268***  0.237***  0.286***  0.266***  0.248*** 
  (0.024)  (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.025)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.031) 
DIPL5  0.223***  0.256***  0.215***  0.193***  0.275***  0.243***  0.219*** 
  (0.020)  (0.024)  (0.026)  (0.025)  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.022) 
DIPL6  0.127***  0.151***  0.133***  0.116***  0.101***  0.087***  0.077*** 
  (0.017)  (0.019)  (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.017) 
DIPL7  0.082***  0.090***  0.091***  0.087***  0.132***  0.120***  0.101*** 
  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.022) 
EXP  0.015***  0.015***  0.016***  0.016***  0.033***  0.035***  0.034*** 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004) 
EXP2 (*100)  -0.024*  -0.022*  -0.038***  -0.035***  -0.076***  -0.087***  -0.082*** 
  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.011) 
TENURE  0.014***  0.013***  0.009***  0.006*  0.004  -0.000  -0.003 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
TENURE2  -0.017  -0.016  -0.006  -0.002  0.012  0.020*  0.022** 
  0.713***  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.11)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.010) 
NBCHILD  0.007  -0.011  0.005  0.001  0.019***  0.017***  0.014*** 
  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005) 
PRECA      -0.019***  -0.015**    -0.022***  -0.021*** 
      (0.007)  (0.007)    (0.006)  (0.006) 
PRECA2 
(*100) 
    0.145***  0.097*   
0.104***  0.095** 
      (0.053)  (0.057)    (0.036)  -0.021*** 
UNEMP      -0.044***  -0.038***    -0.073***  -0.069*** 
      (0.008)  (0.008)    (0.011)  (0.010) 
UNEMP2 
(*100) 
   
0.356***  0.322***     0.687***  0.695*** 
      (0.074)  (0.072)     (0.149)  (0.140) 
CHILDOUT      -0.025***  -0.021***    -0.018  -0.026 
      (0.005)  (0.004)    (0.031)  (0.028) 
CHILDOUT2 
(*100) 
    0.110***  0.096***   
0.222  0.275 
      (0.022)  (0.022)    (0.369)  (0.338) 
TRAINING      0.025*  0.011    0.009  0.005 
      (0.015)  (0.015)    (0.009)  (0.009) 
TRAINING2 
(*100) 
    -0.214  -0.048   
0.021  0.095 
      (0.403)  (0.393)    (0.123)  (0.115) 
OTHERO      -0.023**  -0.017*    -0.069***  -0.057** 
      (0.010)  (0.010)    (0.023)  (0.022) 
OTHERO2 
(*100) 
    0.103*  0.084   
0.406**  0.368* 
      (0.077)  (0.075)    (0.204)  (0.201) 
PARTIME        -0.027*      0.026 
        (0.014)      (0.038)   29 
PUBLIC        0.035**      0.052** 
        (0.017)      (0.025) 
PTPUB2        0.071***      0.003 
        (026)      (0.087) 
PAIDHSUP        0.142***      0.087*** 
        (026)      (0.019) 
RESP        0.104***      0.104*** 
        (0.014)      (0.012) 
AGE1  -0.010  -0.031  -0.113***  -0.103***  -0.040  -0.090**  -0.081** 
  (0.028)  (0.030)  (0.036)  (0.034)  (0.035)  (0.036)  (0.035) 
AGE2  0.001  -0.008  -0.057***  -0.048**  -0.039*  -0.067***  -0.060*** 
  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.021)  (0.022)  (0.021) 
COUPLE  0.011  0.000  -0.003  0.001  0.043***  0.037**  0.021 
  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.014) 
IMMI  -0.019  -0.041  -0.041  -0.023  -0.090***  -0.067***  -0.054** 
  (0.030)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.029)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.025) 
HEALTH  -0.034**  -0.041**  -0.039**  -0.036**  -0.039**  -0.030*  -0.037** 
  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
IDF  0.123***  0.127***  0.119***  0.109***  0.124***  0.125***  0.115*** 
  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015) 
FIRM1        -0.085***      -0.126*** 
        (0.020)      (0.020) 
FIRM2        -0.078***      -0.065*** 
        (0.022)      (0.021) 
FIRM3        -0.050**      -0.042** 
        (0.021)      (0.020) 
FIRM4        -0.073***      -0.052** 
        (0.022)      (0.021) 
FIRM5        -0.070***      -0.018 
        (0.026)      (0.025) 
SECT1        -0.011      0.061** 
        (0.019)      (0.025) 
SECT2        0.069**      0.101*** 
        (0.035)      (0.028) 
SECT3        -0.079***      -0.007 
        (0.017)      (0.029) 
SECT4        0.061***      0.078*** 
        (0.019)      (0.026) 
EVENING        0.039**      0.005 
        (0.019)      (0.020) 
SUNDAYR        0.048***      0.037* 
        (0.017)      (0.022) 
SUNDAYO        0.093***      0.042*** 
        (0.016)      (0.013) 
NIGHT        0.011      0.029 
        (0.028)      (0.025) 
IMR    0.140***  0.119***  0.112***       
    (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.034)       
Constant  1.579***  1.558***  1.712***  1.778***  1.662***  1.763***  1.771*** 
  (0.038)  (0.040)  (0.054)  (0.055)  (0.051)  (0.053)  (0.060) 
Observations  3101  3101  3101  3101  3131  3131  3131 
R-squared  0.41  0.42  0.43  0.49  0.44  0.45  0.49 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (White‟s method) 
 (1‟), (2‟), (3‟): Standard errors are estimated by bootstraps (1000 replications) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  30 
Appendix 4: OLS regressions (men and women aged 39-49) dependent var = lwh 
VARIABLES  Model 1   Model 2  Model 3  Model  4 
  Women   
 
Men  
Women   
 
Men  
Women   
 
Men  
Women   
 
Men  
























DIPL1  0.840***  0.842***  0.948***  0.787***  0.765***  0.889***  0.663***  0.689***  0.815***  0.357***  0.350***  0.518*** 
  (14.15)  (12.81)  (22.64)  (12.56)  (10.40)  (20.75)  (10.39)  (9.51)  (19.07)  (5.44)  (4.26)  (11.58) 
DIPL2  0.746***  0.657***  0.631***  0.695***  0.598***  0.586***  0.604***  0.507***  0.554***  0.390***  0.300***  0.309*** 
  (14.70)  (11.64)  (15.02)  (13.11)  (9.49)  (13.80)  (11.19)  (8.05)  (13.16)  (7.14)  (4.57)  (7.25) 
DIPL3  0.542***  0.492***  0.424***  0.505***  0.434***  0.388***  0.424***  0.411***  0.347***  0.252***  0.263***  0.163*** 
  (10.36)  (8.91)  (10.65)  (9.44)  (7.10)  (9.70)  (7.83)  (6.78)  (8.88)  (4.63)  (4.27)  (4.23) 
DIPL4  0.397***  0.270***  0.385***  0.375***  0.240***  0.374***  0.319***  0.207***  0.349***  0.208***  0.127**  0.183*** 
  (7.79)  (5.30)  (8.26)  (7.34)  (4.50)  (7.98)  (6.19)  (3.98)  (7.57)  (4.16)  (2.46)  (4.11) 
DIPL5  0.332***  0.317***  0.344***  0.318***  0.291***  0.317***  0.256***  0.273***  0.273***  0.158***  0.212***  0.156*** 
  (6.01)  (5.46)  (8.17)  (5.77)  (4.79)  (7.51)  (4.61)  (4.58)  (6.67)  (2.96)  (3.65)  (3.95) 
DIPL6  0.196***  0.181***  0.116***  0.192***  0.167***  0.109***  0.144***  0.163***  0.093***  0.093**  0.125***  0.072*** 
  (4.69)  (4.60)  (4.47)  (4.58)  (4.09)  (4.21)  (3.43)  (4.12)  (3.72)  (2.32)  (3.28)  (3.08) 
DIPL7  0.125**  0.108**  0.176***  0.121**  0.120**  0.162***  0.097*  0.130***  0.123***  0.055  0.118**  0.074** 
  (2.43)  (2.23)  (4.83)  (2.37)  (2.44)  (4.45)  (1.94)  (2.70)  (3.50)  (1.16)  (2.58)  (2.21) 
EXP  0.000  -0.002  0.034**  0.002  0.006  0.031**  0.002  -0.002  0.031**  0.002  -0.000  0.033*** 
  (0.01)  (0.17)  (2.46)  (0.10)  (0.49)  (2.21)  (0.14)  (0.17)  (2.29)  (0.13)  (0.00)  (2.65) 
EXP2 (*100)  0.008  0.030  -0.066**  -0.002  -0.005  -0.067**  -0.002  0.022  -0.064**  -0.001  0.019  -0.073*** 
  (0.23)  (0.99)  (2.15)  (0.05)  (0.13)  (2.13)  (0.06)  (0.65)  (2.13)  (0.03)  (0.60)  (2.61) 
TENURE  0.008  0.014**  0.005  0.003  0.012*  0.002  -0.001  0.013**  -0.000  0.001  0.010*  0.000 
  (1.44)  (2.23)  (1.08)  (0.45)  (1.79)  (0.50)  (0.16)  (2.11)  (0.02)  (0.17)  (1.74)  (0.05) 
TENURE2 (*100)  -0.188  -2.212  0.719  0.981  -1.696  1.122  1.610  -3.443  1.028  1.130  -2.349  1.054 
  (0.10)  (0.91)  (0.49)  (0.54)  (0.69)  (0.75)  (0.92)  (1.45)  (0.72)  (0.69)  (1.04)  (0.79) 
NBCHILD  0.012  -0.001  0.013  0.013  -0.006  0.008  0.015  -0.008  0.006  0.011  -0.014  0.005 
  (0.91)  (0.08)  (1.58)  (1.01)  (0.34)  (1.04)  (1.24)  (0.49)  (0.80)  (0.95)  (0.87)  (0.64) 
COUPLE  0.017  -0.054  0.071***  0.010  -0.061*  0.056**  0.019  -0.032  0.039  0.015  -0.030  0.023 
  (0.60)  (1.50)  (2.71)  (0.37)  (1.71)  (2.15)  (0.72)  (0.93)  (1.51)  (0.59)  (0.89)  (0.95) 
IMMI  -0.031  -0.162***  -0.107***  -0.039  -0.159***  -0.079**  -0.012  -0.106**  -0.071**  -0.000  -0.100**  -0.047 
  (0.62)  (3.26)  (3.09)  (0.76)  (3.15)  (2.26)  (0.24)  (2.13)  (2.11)  (0.01)  (2.10)  (1.49) 
HEALTH  -0.032  -0.026  -0.038  -0.025  -0.031  -0.026  -0.020  -0.034  -0.041*  -0.017  -0.016  -0.023 
  (1.04)  (0.74)  (1.55)  (0.83)  (0.89)  (1.05)  (0.69)  (1.01)  (1.73)  (0.60)  (0.50)  (1.02)   31 
IDF  0.128***  0.121***  0.105***  0.129***  0.116***  0.108***  0.103***  0.082**  0.091***  0.059**  0.076**  0.066*** 
  (4.55)  (3.22)  (4.41)  (4.59)  (3.12)  (4.59)  (3.69)  (2.19)  (3.94)  (2.25)  (2.13)  (3.05) 
PRECA        0.019  -0.019  -0.017*  0.022  -0.013  -0.016*  0.027*  -0.004  -0.014 
        (1.19)  (1.60)  (1.73)  (1.38)  (1.10)  (1.72)  (1.82)  (0.33)  (1.64) 
PRECA2        -0.001  0.001*  0.001  -0.002  0.001  0.001  -0.002  0.000  0.001 
        (1.02)  (1.65)  (1.33)  (1.27)  (0.79)  (1.01)  (1.52)  (0.15)  (1.06) 
UNEMP        -0.070***  -0.047***  -0.080***  -0.058***  -0.039**  -0.071***  -0.048***  -0.039**  -0.052*** 
        (4.14)  (2.61)  (4.19)  (3.52)  (2.26)  (3.84)  (3.13)  (2.35)  (3.00) 
UNEMP2        0.005***  0.005**  0.008**  0.004***  0.005**  0.007**  0.003**  0.005**  0.005* 
        (2.97)  (2.12)  (2.51)  (2.61)  (1.98)  (2.37)  (2.36)  (2.29)  (1.79) 
CHILDOUT        0.000  -0.019**  0.008  0.000  -0.018**  0.009  0.000  -0.014*  0.026 
        (.)  (2.38)  (0.16)  (.)  (2.39)  (0.18)  (.)  (1.91)  (0.57) 
CHILDOUT2        0.000  0.001**  0.002  0.000  0.001**  0.001  0.000  0.001**  -0.001 
        (.)  (2.48)  (0.31)  (.)  (2.40)  (0.19)  (.)  (2.12)  (0.17) 
TRANING        0.020  0.013  0.006  -0.005  -0.004  -0.000  -0.011  -0.009  -0.002 
        (0.80)  (0.45)  (0.47)  (0.22)  (0.15)  (0.03)  (0.47)  (0.33)  (0.18) 
TRAINING2        0.001  0.002  0.001  0.005  0.002  0.002  0.006  0.001  0.001 
        (0.26)  (0.28)  (0.52)  (0.98)  (0.33)  (1.17)  (1.24)  (0.26)  (1.00) 
OTHERO        -0.026  -0.021  -0.079**  -0.015  -0.016  -0.069**  -0.012  -0.002  -0.069** 
        (1.25)  (1.06)  (2.24)  (0.74)  (0.86)  (2.02)  (0.63)  (0.12)  (2.16) 
OTHERO2        0.001  -0.000  0.004  0.001  -0.000  0.004  0.001  -0.001  0.005 
        (1.15)  (0.20)  (1.04)  (0.80)  (0.23)  (1.03)  (0.81)  (0.82)  (1.38) 
PARTIME              -0.068**  0.038  0.077  -0.047  0.041  0.071 
              (1.99)  (1.26)  (1.28)  (1.50)  (1.41)  (1.26) 
PTPUB2              0.050  -0.099*  0.094  0.058  -0.057  0.012 
              (0.94)  (1.82)  (0.84)  (1.16)  (1.11)  (0.11) 
PUBLIC              0.047  0.105***  0.081**  0.042  0.076**  0.088*** 
              (1.35)  (2.63)  (2.44)  (1.29)  (2.00)  (2.84) 
FIRM1              -0.124***  -0.119**  -0.143***  -0.122***  -0.077  -0.100*** 
              (3.13)  (2.27)  (4.70)  (3.32)  (1.54)  (3.51) 
FIRM2              -0.106**  -0.124**  -0.041  -0.099**  -0.058  -0.024 
              (2.48)  (2.20)  (1.23)  (2.48)  (1.08)  (0.75) 
FIRM3              -0.096**  -0.048  -0.031  -0.098***  -0.013  -0.020 
              (2.47)  (0.90)  (1.07)  (2.70)  (0.26)  (0.75) 
FIRM4              -0.086**  -0.026  -0.035  -0.080**  0.006  -0.033 
              (2.02)  (0.45)  (1.11)  (2.01)  (0.11)  (1.11) 
FIRM5              -0.085*  -0.127*  0.000  -0.058  -0.077  0.011   32 
              (1.73)  (1.84)  (0.00)  (1.25)  (1.18)  (0.33) 
SECT1              -0.016  -0.032  0.062*  0.017  0.020  0.063* 
              (0.40)  (0.70)  (1.76)  (0.44)  (0.42)  (1.88) 
SECT2              0.118*  -0.035  0.122***  0.112*  -0.087  0.115*** 
              (1.90)  (0.33)  (2.98)  (1.93)  (0.86)  (2.99) 
SECT3              -0.066*  -0.081**  0.029  -0.050  -0.070**  0.002 
              (1.80)  (2.15)  (0.75)  (1.46)  (1.98)  (0.07) 
SECT4              0.071*  0.088*  0.092**  0.040  0.064  0.068* 
              (1.76)  (1.83)  (2.34)  (1.05)  (1.38)  (1.86) 
paidhsup              0.121**  0.128**  0.107***  0.135***  0.149***  0.114*** 
              (2.25)  (2.29)  (3.50)  (2.68)  (2.81)  (4.04) 
EVENING              -0.008  0.105**  -0.002  -0.003  0.113**  0.007 
              (0.21)  (2.22)  (0.08)  (0.09)  (2.52)  (0.27) 
SUNDAYR              0.036  0.010  0.044  0.021  0.035  0.062** 
              (0.89)  (0.25)  (1.41)  (0.56)  (0.90)  (2.12) 
SUNDAYO              0.118***  0.052  0.064***  0.093***  0.041  0.049** 
              (3.68)  (1.41)  (2.97)  (3.13)  (1.16)  (2.43) 
NIGHT              0.023  -0.034  0.036  0.063  0.011  0.067** 
              (0.39)  (0.41)  (1.02)  (1.14)  (0.14)  (2.03) 
RESP              0.106***  0.100***  0.120***  0.034  0.047  0.048*** 
              (3.93)  (2.59)  (6.73)  (1.31)  (1.23)  (2.78) 
OCCUP2                    0.518***  0.591***  0.439*** 
                    (9.62)  (7.38)  (14.11) 
OCCUP3                    0.273***  0.280***  0.190*** 
                    (5.92)  (5.41)  (8.53) 
OCCUP4                    0.116***  0.101**  0.038 
                    (2.86)  (2.39)  (1.30) 
IMR  0.126  0.219**  0.000  0.107  0.188**  0.000  0.046  0.168*  0.000  0.000  0.123  0.000 
  (1.39)  (2.45)  (.)  (1.19)  (2.08)  (.)  (0.52)  (1.91)  (.)  (0.00)  (1.47)  (.) 
Constant  1.691***  1.630***  1.535***  1.799***  1.767***  1.687***  1.917***  1.868***  1.663***  1.829***  1.719***  1.619*** 
  (10.98)  (17.41)  (9.83)  (8.90)  (11.77)  (10.42)  (9.42)  (11.94)  (10.30)  (9.54)  (11.26)  (10.77) 
                         
Observations  781  575  1360  781  575  1360  781  575  1360  781  575  1360 
R-squared  0.44  0.43  0.43  0.46  0.46  0.45  0.52  0.52  0.51  0.58  0.57  0.58 
Standard errors in parentheses are estimated by bootstraps for women (1000 replications)  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         